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Financial Market Reaction to Federal Reserve Communications: 
Does the Crisis Make a Difference? 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies the effects of Federal Reserve communications on US financial market 
returns from 1998 to 2009 and asks whether a significant change occurred during the financial 
crisis of August 2007–December 2009. We find, first, that central bank communication moves 
financial markets in the intended direction. In particular, shorter maturities are affected in an 
economically meaningful way. Second, speeches by the Chairman generate relatively more 
public attention than communication by other governors or presidents. Finally, central bank 
communication is even more market relevant during the financial crisis subsample. 
 
JEL:     E52, G14 
Keywords:   Central  Bank  Communication,  Federal  Reserve,  Financial  Crisis,  Financial 
Markets, Monetary Policy 
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1. Introduction 
The role central bank communication plays in monetary policy has been studied extensively. 
The majority of this work concentrates on formal communication, as it examines statements 
after interest rate decisions, minutes of committee meetings, or monetary policy reports. An 
even larger number of papers examine the impact of the rate decisions themselves. However, 
speeches  are  a  substantive  part  of  central  bank  communication,  too.  These  less  formal 
channels of communication are rarely studied, which is surprising as the Federal Reserve 
(Fed) has not only improved its formal communication over the last decade but, starting in the 
late  1990,  also  increased,  to  an  even  greater  degree,  the  number  of  ‘informal’  speeches 
delivered.
1 The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meets only eight times a year and 
the monetary policy report  is issued semi-annually. Thus, speeches might  be an additional 
source of information for market participants. Given their greater frequency, speeches can be 
interpreted as an update to formal statements and monetary policy decisions and hence market 
participants might very well utilise and react to this additional information. 
There  is  a  growing  body  of  literature  investigating  the  effects  of  (formal) 
communication on financial markets (for a comprehensive survey of the relevant literature , 
see Blinder et al., 2008). Here, we summarise a few selected studies only. An important study 
closely related to our paper is by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007). In their p anel analysis of 
three central banks, they do not examine the communication content directly as they use 
newswire information based on FOMC communication to create their indicators. They find 
that speeches or interviews regarding the economic outlook (EO) have a consistently positive 
impact on daily bond returns  for up to 10 years. News concerning the course of monetary 
policy (MP) has a positive effect on only a few maturities. On the equity market, an indication 
of rising interest rates leads to declining returns, whereas positive EO news generates higher 
returns. Some other papers also assess the impact of mostly formal communications by the 
Federal Reserve (e.g.,  Connolly and Kohler, 2004; Kohn and Sack, 2004; Chirinko and 
Curran, 2005; Reinhart and Sack, 2005). These papers have at least three findings in common. 
First,  central  bank  communications  regarding  the  economic  outlook  and  the  course  of 
monetary policy have a significant impact on financial market returns and volatility. Second, 
the impact on financial markets is larger when the communication channel is more formal: 
post-meeting statements accompanying interest decisions or monetary policy reports are more 
                                                 
1 In 1998, 114 speeches were delivered by FOMC members; in 2006 the central bankers spoke 190 times. 4 
important than speeches. Third, the more prominent the position held by the speaker, the 
stronger the financial market reaction.
2 
This paper  makes two significant  contributions  to the literature. First, we  use  an 
extensive data set covering all speeches delivered by FOMC members and study their impact 
on US financial market returns (see Hayo et al. 2012). The full set of original communication 
events is coded into dummy variables on the basis of their written content. We differentiate 
between news regarding monetary policy and economic outlook as well as between different 
types  of  communication  (speeches,  monetary  policy  reports  and  testimony,  post-meeting 
statements)  and  by  positional  classification  (chairmen,  other  members  of  the  Board  of 
Governors, voting presidents, and nonvoting presidents). Second, this is the first study on 
informal communication on US financial markets that also covers the recent financial crisis 
and explicitly addresses the question of whether there is a different financial market reaction 
during ‘crisis times’ compared to during ‘normal times.’ During the recent financial crisis, we 
expect central bank communications to play an even more pronounced role. Like many other 
central  banks,  the  Fed  implemented  various  measures,  in  addition  to  lowering  short-term 
interest rates, with the aim of mitigating the effects of the crisis. As some of these additional 
measures are ‘unorthodox’, the Fed also put a lot of emphasis on communication in an effort 
to explain and prepare the public for them. 
The sample consists of daily observations from 1998 to 2009. Econometrically, we 
employ a GARCH specification of financial returns to capture the autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity that characterises many financial series. Employing data from the US bond 
and stock markets, we examine three related research questions. First, do speeches have an 
effect on financial market returns as a result of traders adjusting their behaviour in light of 
their  content?  Second,  are  there  quantitative  differences  between  the  sizes  of  the  impact 
across different positions on the Federal Open Market Committee? Third, compared to normal 
times, is there a different reaction to central bank communications during the financial crisis, 
the start of which we set to August 2007? 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we explain our 
approach  of  measuring  Federal  Reserve  communication  and  provide  details  on  the 
construction  of  the  central  bank  news.  Section  3  describes  the  data  set  and  empirical 
                                                 
2 For every major central bank there is at least one study showing that communications other than postmeeting 
statements or monetary policy reports have an influence on financial markets. For instance, see Guthrie and 
Wright (2000) for New  Zealand, Connolly and Kohler (2004) for six central banks (Australia,  Canada,  the 
European Central Bank, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Andersson et al. (2006) for 
Sweden, Reeves and Sawicki (2007) for the United Kingdom, de Haan (2008) for the European Central Bank, 
Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010b) for Canada, and Ranaldo and Rossi (2010) for Switzerland. 5 
methodology.  In  Section  4,  we  empirically  study  the  effects  of  communication  on  US 
financial market returns. Section 5 discusses the special role of central bank communication 
during the financial crisis. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring Federal Reserve Communications 
For  our  analysis,  we  employ  a  data  set  that  covers  summaries  of  1,994  speeches,  227 
congressional  hearings  (including  the  semi-annual  monetary  policy  reports),  and  94  post-
meeting statements from members of the Board of Governors (BOG) and the regional Fed 
presidents (see Hayo et al. 2012).
3 There is consensus in the literature about how to measure 
the timing of statements accompanying target rate decisions and  monetary policy  reports. 
These are predefined events and the  content of the  communications can be extracted from 
central bank websites. In the case of the less formal and irregular ly timed  speeches, the 
majority of surveys rely on financial newswire reports, but even advocates of these reports are 
quick to point out  a major drawback  of them. For example,  Blinder et al.  (2008)  state: 
‘However,  it  is  not  always  straightforward  to  determine  exactly  when  a  communication 
”event” took place. For example, when a late-Thursday media report on a Tuesday interview 
with  a  policymaker  causes  financial  markets  to  react  on  Friday  morning,  was  the 
communication  event  on  Tuesday,  Thursday,  or  Friday?’  (2008,  924).  Ehrmann  and 
Fratzscher  (2007,  15)  add:  ‘Newswire  services  are  selective  in  their  reporting,  thus  not 
covering all statements made by all the relevant committee members ….’ Under our approach, 
all central  banker speeches  are  extracted  from  central bank  websites.  The  Fed  accurately 
records the communications of its governors as well as the regional presidents’ speeches. 
Every speech is recorded, along with its time of delivery, so one can verify whether the actual 
news is created during market hours or afterward. Using this approach, we ensure that every 
piece of news in central bank speeches is captured at the time it is actually created. 
The next step after timing the news correctly is to extract the direction of central bank 
communication, i.e., what is the monetary policy inclination or what is the central banker’s 
forecast about the economic outlook?
4 A standard practice in the literature (e.g., Ehrmann and 
                                                 
3 Subsamples and variants of this data set have been successfully employed in two different contexts. Hayo and 
Neuenkirch  (2010a)  explain  US  target  rate  decisions  using  macroeconomic  variables  and  Federal  Reserve 
communications. They discover that communications significantly explain and predict target rate decisions and 
improve  explanatory  power  over  a  Taylor  (1993)  rule.  Hayo  and  Neuenkirch  (2011)  use  US  regional  and 
national macroeconomic variables to explain the content of these communications. They find that the opinions 
expressed by Fed governors and presidents can be described by a Taylor (1993) rule and, particularly, that 
regional economic conditions affect the contents of presidents’ speeches. 
4 Several papers avoid making  suppositions about the direction of monetary policy or the economic outlook. 
These papers use only the communication events, without any direction as an explanatory variable. For instance, 6 
Fratzscher,  2007)  is  to  assign  numerical  values  using  the  communications  content  (and 
intention): for instance, hawkish statements indicating tighter monetary policy are captured 
with ‘+1’; dovish statements inclining future rate cuts are assigned ‘–1’. We, too, quantify the 
direction of communication on a numerical scale, but we go one step further: positive and 
negative communications are captured by separate variables to allow for the possibility of 
asymmetric market reactions to good and bad news. The economic outlook can be ‘positive’ 
(EO +) or ‘negative’ (EO –); ‘tightening’ (MP +) or ‘easing’ (MP –) are used to classify 
monetary policy stance.
5 
Coding communication events into different categories carries the risk of introducing 
judgment error  on the part of  the researcher (or the newswire agency)   into the analysis.
6 
Content  analysis,  which  is  a  ‘technique  for  making  inferences  by  objectively  and 
systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages’ (Holsti, 1969, 14), can help 
reduce the risk of misclassification. In line with this idea, each speech was carefully read and 
independently coded into the dummy categories by three different individuals. In the rare case 
of a conflict between the classifications, the relevant speech was checked one more time and 
the coding adjusted accordingly.
7 In our analysis, we engage in extensive robustness testing to 
ensure that our results are not dependent on possibly individual-specific coding of ambiguous 
content. 
Communication events occurring after market closure were coded as if they happened 
the next day. Data are obtained from the official websites of the Fed regional banks and the 
Board of the Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Table 1 summarises the frequency of 
these events. From the table, it can be observed that (i) more comments were made regarding 
the EO than the MP stance, and (ii) a positive economic outlook and hawkish comments occur 
far more often than a negative economic outlook or an indicat ion of expansionary monetary 
policy. The first finding is due to an apparent change in Fed communication strategy. In the 
early years of our sample period, speaker s concentrated on explaining previous interest rate 
                                                                                                                                                         
Kohn and Sack (2004) study the effects of U.S. central bank communication events on the volatility of financial 
variables. The simple idea behind this approach is that if communications affect the returns on financial assets, 
the volatility of these returns should be higher on days of central bank communications. On the one hand, this 
approach is less prone to mistakes by the researcher or misinterpretation by financial newswires. The obvious 
drawback  is  that  there  is  no  control  for  whether  markets  move  in  the  correct  (or  intended)  direction. 
Additionally, equality restrictions between different types of news are set, so that one cannot distinguish between 
possibly larger reactions to bad than to good news. Finally, higher volatility can be an indication of (i) higher 
noise reflecting uncertainty or (ii) actual news requiring traders to alter their behaviour. 
5 Speeches without any information on monetary policy stance or economic outlook and speeches with  ‘neutral’ 
content are coded as non-events. 
6 An alternative to subjective coding is using content analysis software (e.g., Lucca and Trebbi, 2009). However, 
communications other than post-meeting statements are not standardised and thus content analysis programs fail 
to detect all relevant systematic patterns in these much more complex texts. 
7 In the Appendix, we provide a few examples of speeches along with our classification of them. 7 
moves, whereas in the later years, monetary policy speeches were more forward looking. 
Also, cheaper liquidity tends to cause few problems for market participants and thus a rate cut 
does not need to be prepared for by the central bank as extensively as does a hike. This second 
point is also due to the asymmetry of the size of target rate hikes and cuts in our sample. 
Target rate increases are mostly performed in 25 basis points (bps) steps and well-prepared 
for  in  advance  by  communication,  which  allows  market  participants  to  make  necessary 
adjustments gradually in the run-up to the expected interest rate decision. In contrast, target 
rate decreases are often done in 50 bps steps and less explained by Fed officials in advance.
8 
 
Table 1: Number of Non-Zero Values for Communication Dummies 
   MP +  MP –  EO +  EO – 
Statement  35  13  33  27 
MPR/Testimony  11  9  38  22 
Board of Governors  33  8  97  44 
Presidents  105  24  282  120 
 
3. Data and Econometric Methodology 
Our  US  financial  market  indicators  comprise  daily  closing  interest  rates  on  government 
securities as well as daily returns on stock markets from January 2, 1998 through December 
31, 2009.
9 As dependent variables, we employ daily changes of 3-month, 6-month, and 1-year 
Treasury bills, and 5-year Treasury notes. For the stock market, we examine the daily growth 
rates of the S&P 500 Index.
10 Descriptive statistics (see Table A1 in the Appendix) show that 
all financial markets series exhibit excess kurtosis, indicating ARCH effects (Engle, 1982). To 
increase the estimation efficiency, we employ a GARCH (1,1) model (Bollerslev, 1986) for 
all bond maturities and the stock market series.
11 The general specification is as follows: 
                                                 
8 On nine occasions in our sample, financial market participants were surprised by an interest rate cut, whereas 
the Fed unexpectedly raised its target rate only four times. Bloomberg surveys are used to identify surprises that 
occur  during  scheduled  meetings.  Intermeeting  moves  are  naturally  classified  as  surprises.  For  instance,  a 
‘surprise hike’ can be (i) an unexpected rise in the target rate or (ii) an unchanged target rate when a rate cut was 
expected. 
9 Data sources: bond and foreign exchange market series—Federal Reserves’ Statistical Releases H10 and H15; 
stock market series—Yahoo! Finance database. 
10 We chose daily data instead of intra-day data for two reasons. At a conceptual level, we are interested in the 
question of whether there are effects of economic importance characterised by some sort of persistence over time 
instead of just picking out shor t blips in the data. Even though the scheduled delivery time of speeches  is 
recorded at the central bank’s website, we find it impossible to time the central bank news precisely in 5-minute 
time intervals, as can be done for newswire reports. 
11  Estimation  within an EGARCH framework (Nelson, 1991) was not possible, as the algorithm did not 
converge. Doornik and Ooms (2008) suggest that the presence of dummy variables could cause such problems. 8 
                                                                                
                                                    
                                                  
         
     
                
            
 
where , and  are parameters or vectors of parameters and t|t-1 
= t(v), with t-1 capturing all the information up to t-1 and t(v) being a t-distribution with v 
degrees of freedom. Equation (1) is an autoregressive-distributed lag model with one lag. The 
vector of financial control variables comprises bond returns, S&P 500 returns, and returns of 
the  US  broad  foreign  exchange  rate  index.
12  Day of the week effects are  captured by 
dummies, using Monday as the reference day. Student-t distributed errors (Bollerslev, 1987) 
are  assumed;  these  provide  a  better  approximation  of  residuals  that  are  not  normally 
distributed. 
We include  in the estimation  the surprise components of several macroeconomic 
announcements commonly watched by market participants.
13  We choose 10 news items: 
advance gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production (IP), and trade balance (TB) to 
capture growth expectations; the In stitute for Supply Management (ISM) survey and the 
Conference  Board  consumer  confidence  (CC)  for  producer  and  consumer  confidence; 
nonfarm payroll (NFP) and the unemployment rate (UR) to proxy  labour market conditions; 
retail sales (RET) for actual consumption; and the consumer price index (CPI) and producer 
price index (PPI) for inflation. We use the same variables as Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), 
but, in contrast to their approach, take into account possible asymmetric reactions of financial 
markets, as the standardised macroeconomic shocks enter the equations as separate positive or 
negative variables on the day of their announcement. 
Furthermore, we control for movements in the Federal Funds target rate (split into 
expected hikes, expected cuts, surprise hikes, and surprise cuts). The next group of variables 
incorporates several variables for the  ‘unorthodox’ measures taken by the Fed during the 
financial crisis. These are grouped into five categories: (i) the discount rate change on August 
17, 2007, (ii) the announcement of joint  initiatives  with  the  federal  government,  (iii) the 
announcement  of  additional  unilateral  liquidity  actions,  (iv)  the  announcement  of 
                                                 
12 The contemporaneous other market returns are omitted to avoid simultaneity problems. 
13  The surprise component of macroeconomic announcements is constructed by subtracting median market 
expectations (obtained through a Bloomberg survey of market participants) from the actually released figure. To 
ensure comparability, we standardise the surprise component by its respective standard deviation. 9 
internationally  coordinated  liquidity  actions,  and  (v)  the  announcement  of  measures  to 
mitigate problems in the asset-backed security market. Finally, we add our communication 
variables:  (i)  postmeeting  statements,  (ii)  monetary  policy  reports  and  testimony,  (iii) 
speeches by the Fed Chairman, (iv) speeches by other  governors, (v) speeches by voting 
presidents, and (vi) speeches by nonvoting presidents, which are coded into four different 
categories (EO +, EO –, MP +, MP –). 
After  estimating  these  rich  GARCH  (1,1)  models,  we  exclude  all  insignificant 
variables in a consistent general-to-specific approach (Hendry, 1995). 
 
4. Federal Reserve Communications and Financial Market Returns 
In this section, we discuss the reaction of financial markets to central bank communications 
using Equation (1) and the full sample period (1998–2009). To assess the relative influence of 
communication compared to other factors, Table 2 also shows the results for macroeconomic 
shocks, target rate changes, and unorthodox measures.
14 
We find that the shorter bond maturities (3-month and 6-month) are affected by a 
larger variety of communications (as well as by target rate changes and unorthodox measures) 
than are the longer maturities (1-year and 5-year). In contrast, macroeconomic surprises are 
more important for the longer maturities. Thu s, US monetary policy actions and related 
communications lead to  ‘target surprises’ rather than to ‘path surprises’ (Gürkaynak et al., 
2005). To put it differently, the Fed is able to change its short-term monetary policy without 
affecting longer-term inflation expectations. However, when significant reactions are found, 
the impact of communication is ascending with maturity. Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) 
report a similar result. 
The monetary policy part of communications is more important than the economic 
outlook as we find only one significant coefficient for the latter. Our interpretation is that 
financial  market  participants  alter  their  expectations  about  the  future  course  of  monetary 
policy  after  central  bank  communications,  whereas  macroeconomic  news  has  more  of  an 
effect on expectations about the real economy. Generally, central bank communications move 
the  financial  markets  in  the  intended  direction:
15  (i)  hawkish communications raise bond 
yields, (ii)  communication indicating a future target rate cut   leads  to  a  decrease in bond 
returns, and (iii) a worse economic outlook decreases stock returns. 
                                                 
14 The coefficients can be interpreted as follows: 0.016 denotes an increase of 3-month bonds by 1.6 bps after a 
one standard deviation shock in NFP +; –0.085 denotes a decrease by 8.5 bps after a 25 bps target rate surprise 
cut; 0.027 denotes an increase by 2.7 bps after a hawkish speech delivered by the Chairman. 
15 All but three coefficients (‘ISM –’ on the stock market and ‘Discount Rate’ on the 1-year and 5-year bond 
market) show the expected sign. 10 
 
Table 2: Reaction of Financial Market Returns (Full Sample) 
   3-month  6-month  1-year  5-year  S&P 500 
IP +                          0.258  0.01 
ISM + 
       
0.014  0.00  0.035  0.00 
   
ISM – 
           
–0.018  0.01  0.398  0.01 
NFP +  0.016  0.01 
   
0.039  0.00  0.061  0.00 
   
NFP –  –0.009  0.02  –0.020  0.00  –0.030  0.00  –0.032  0.00 
   
Retail + 
   
0.008  0.00  0.011  0.02  0.027  0.00 
   
Retail – 
   
–0.005  0.02  –0.012  0.00 
       
TB – 
       
–0.007  0.01  –0.014  0.01 
   
UR –        0.010  0.00                   
Target Rate –  –0.032  0.00  –0.032  0.00                   
Target Rate Surp. + 
   
0.083  0.02 
           
Target Rate Surp. –  –0.085  0.00  –0.061  0.03  –0.062  0.02 
       
Discount Rate  –0.032  0.00  –0.032  0.00  0.008  0.00  0.090  0.00  2.488  0.00 
Joint w/ Government  –0.006  0.02  –0.016  0.02 
           
Coord. Liquidity  –0.025  0.00  –0.035  0.00 
           
ABS Measure              –0.008  0.02             
Statement MP –  –0.010  0.05  –0.024  0.00 
           
MPR/Test. EO – 
               
–0.710  0.01 
Chairman MP +  0.027  0.00  0.017  0.01  0.036  0.02  0.039  0.00 
   
Chairman MP –  –0.047  0.00 
               
Voting Pres. MP –  –0.011  0.03  –0.015  0.00 
           
Nonvot. Pres. MP + 
   
0.007  0.03  0.009  0.02 
       
Nonvot. Pres. MP –  –0.011  0.00  –0.014  0.02                   
Notes: Figures in italics show p-values. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. Only the variables of 
interest of the reduced model resulting from the testing-down process are listed. The testing-down restrictions 
are never rejected in any of the models: Chi
2(44) = 40.5; Chi
2(41) = 52.5; Chi
2(44) = 57.2; Chi
2(51) = 68.4; 
Chi
2(55) = 72.9, respectively. Full tables are available upon request. 
 
One  of  the  novel  aspects  of  this  paper  is  its  consideration  of  communication  by 
individual members of the Fed. We compare the impact of speeches by the Chairman, other 
governors, voting presidents, and nonvoting presidents on US financial markets. Our prior is 
that the ‘inside’ governors (particularly the Chairman) should command greater attention from 
financial  market  participants  and,  therefore,  exert  a  greater  influence  on  returns  than  the 
‘outside’  presidents  (particularly  the  nonvoting  presidents).  In  line  with  the  literature 
(Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2007), our results suggest that communications by the Chairman of 
the  Board  of  Governors  generate  relatively  more  public  attention  than  speeches  by  other 11 
governors or presidents.
16 We find no significant differences between voting and nonvoting 
presidents. Finally, we also find evidence of the asymmetry hypothesis as  dovish speeches 
(when they are  significant) move interest rates more than  hawkish ones; for example, we 
observe  differences  between  the  Chairman’s  positive  and  negative  monetary  policy 
inclination.
17 
In the next step, we evaluate the economic impact of central bank communication on 
financial markets relative to other macroeconomic shocks. The coefficients in Table 2 can be 
misleading insofar as some news categories might typically occur more often than others. As 
a consequence, a  fairly  small coefficient  might have a large cumulative influence on  the 
observed behaviour of financial markets if the frequency of this event is relatively high , and 
vice versa. Therefore, we compare the impact by taking into account the frequency of news as 
measured in our 12-year sample. Table 3 shows the cumulative impact on returns per category 
on each market. 
 
Table 3: Cumulative Absolute Returns for Bond and Stock Markets (Full Sample) 
   3-month  6-month  1-year  5-year  S&P 500 
Macro News  1.3  2.7  5.9  9.5  33.0 
Communications  0.6  1.2  0.7  0.1  15.6 
… Monetary Policy  0.6  1.2  0.7  0.1   
… Economic Outlook          15.6 
Note: The figures are calculated by taking the absolute estimates from Table 2, which are then multiplied by the 
respective frequency of news. 
 
Due to their higher frequency, macroeconomic shocks exert a larger impact on all 
bond maturities as well as on the stock market. However, for the short maturities (3-month 
and  6-month)  and  the  equity  market,  the  influence  of  central  bank  communication  is 
economically  relevant,  as  its  cumulative  impact  is  almost  half  as  large  as  that  of 
macroeconomic shocks. In confirmation of the finding that Fed communications cause ‘target 
surprises’  rather  than  ‘path  surprises’,  the  maximum  impact  of  monetary  policy 
communications is found for 6-month bonds and is close to zero for the 5 year horizon. 
 
                                                 
16 Statistical tests confirm this result for 3-month bonds (Chairman MP – vs. Voting Pres. MP –: Chi
2(1) = 
14.2**; Chairman MP – vs. Nonvot. Pres. MP –: Chi
2(1) = 18.0**). For the longer maturities, we find larger 
point estimates for the Chairman. 
17 3-month bonds: Chairman MP + vs. Chairman MP –: Chi
2(1) = 5.6*. 12 
5. The Special Role of Central Bank Communication During the Financial Crisis 
Because our sample includes the period August 2007–December 2009, we can address the 
question  of  whether  there  is  a  different  financial  market  reaction  during  ‘crisis  times’ 
compared to during ‘normal times.’ We expect central bank communications to play an even 
more pronounced role during the recent financial crisis, as the Fed put a great deal of effort 
into  preparing  and  explaining  both  its  conventional  and  unconventional  monetary  policy 
actions. Table 4 presents the results for Equation (1) estimated over the subsample period of 
August 2007–December 2009. 
 
Table 4: Reaction of Financial Market Returns (Financial Crisis) 
   3-month  6-month  1-year  5-year  S&P 500 
Statement MP –  –0.012  0.08  –0.029  0.00  –0.068  0.00        1.423  0.01 
Statement EO + 
   
0.008  0.02 
           
Statement EO –                          –4.555  0.01 
Chairman MP –  –0.042  0.00  –0.018  0.00                   
Chairman EO + 
       
0.030  0.00  0.151  0.00  1.995  0.00 
Chairman EO –        –0.065  0.00  –0.079  0.00             
Oth. Govern. MP +  0.046  0.00  0.029  0.01              –1.412  0.00 
Oth. Govern. MP – 
               
1.072  0.10 
Oth. Govern. EO –  –0.027  0.00  –0.025  0.00                   
Voting Pres. MP –  –0.011  0.01                         
Nonvot. Pres. MP –  –0.011  0.00  –0.018  0.00        –0.042  0.01       
Notes: Figures in italics show p-values. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. Only the variables of 
interest of the reduced model resulting from the testing-down process are listed. The testing-down restrictions 
are never rejected in any of the models: Chi
2(43) = 50.0; Chi
2(42) = 53.1; Chi
2(44) = 60.4; Chi
2(46) = 54.4; 
Chi
2(45) = 52.2, respectively. Full tables are available upon request. 
 
As in case of the full sample, all significant central bank communication variables 
move financial markets  in the intended direction. The shorter maturities (3-month and 6-
month) are affected by a larger variety of communications than are the longer maturities (1-
year and 5-year). In general, we find a greater number of significant communication variables 
in  this  subsample  (particularly  for  the  stock  market),  indicating  that  central  bank 
communication plays a  more pronounced role during the financial crisis.  In addition, the 
absolute size of the coefficient is higher on bond and stock markets. 
Our results suggest that communication by the Chairman generates a (slightly) larger 
reaction from financial markets than do speeches by other governors (which are, however, 
significant during the financial crisis) and both receive much more attention than those by 13 
presidents.
18 Finally, we find speeches by nonvoting presidents to be more important in terms 
of significant coefficients than those of voting presidents. 
During the financial crisis, the economic outlook  aspect of communication becomes 
relevant. Given that there is no room for further target rate  cuts at the zero lower bound, 
financial markets might perceive a negative economic outlook as  an ‘implied easing’ signal, 
in the sense that the Fed will keep rates low for a long period of time. To assess the relative 
economic importance of communication referring to the economic outlook or the monetary 
policy inclination, we take into account the impact of the frequency of news. Table 5 shows 
the cumulative impact on returns per category on each market in our sample. 
 
Table 5: Cumulative Absolute Returns for Bond and Stock Markets (Financial Crisis) 
   3-month  6-month  1-year  5-year  S&P 500 
Communications  1.0  1.4  1.2  0.8  74.6 
… Monetary Policy  0.6  0.8  0.9  0.6  27.0 
… Economic Outlook  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.2  47.5 
Note: The figures are calculated by taking the absolute estimates from Table 4, which are then multiplied by the 
respective frequency of news. 
 
Although the economic outlook is now relevant for all bond maturities, the cumulative 
influence of the monetary policy inclination continues to be larger. A second notable finding 
is that—in comparison to the full sample (Table 3)—the cumulative impact is larger on all 
bond  markets  and,  in  particular,  on  the  stock  market.  This  confirms  that  central  bank 
communication was of increased importance during the August 2007–September 2009 period. 
As in the case of the full sample, communication exerts the largest influence on 6-month 
bonds, but the difference from other maturities is smaller during the financial crisis. 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the effects of Federal Reserve communications, particularly speeches, 
on financial market returns for the period 1998 to 2009. Whereas previous literature relies on 
newswire reports to create a data set of central bank news, we employ a different approach 
and extract all speeches, along with their time of delivery, from the Fed’s website. Using a 
GARCH model and this comprehensive data set, we analyse the influence of speeches, post-
meeting statements, and congressional hearings (including the semi-annual monetary policy 
                                                 
18 Statistical tests confirm this finding for 3-month bonds (Chairman MP – vs. Voting Pres. MP –: Chi
2(1) = 
8.6**; Chairman MP – vs. Nonvot. Pres. MP –: Chi
2(1) = 9.6**) and 6-month bonds (Chairman EO – vs. Oth. 
Govern. EO –: Chi
2(1) = 11.0**). 14 
reports) on bond and stock markets in the United States. We find the following answers to our 
three research questions. 
First, central bank communication moves financial markets in the intended direction. 
Hawkish communications raise bond yields; communications indicating a future target rate 
cut lead to a decrease in bond returns. Shorter maturities are affected by a larger variety of 
communications than are longer maturities and the monetary policy part of communications is 
more important than the economic outlook part. A comparison with the absolute cumulative 
impact of macroeconomic shocks reveals that central bank communication is economically 
relevant—at least for the shorter maturities and the stock market. 
Second, one of the novel aspects of this study is its consideration of communication by 
individual members of the Fed. Our results suggest that communications by the Chairman 
generate relatively more public attention than speeches by other governors or presidents. We 
find  no  significant  difference  in  the  attention  given  to  speeches  of  voting  and  nonvoting 
presidents. Finally, financial markets show an asymmetric reaction: dovish speeches move 
interest rates more than hawkish ones. 
Third, as to whether there is a different financial market reaction during ‘crisis times’ 
compared  to  during  ‘normal  times’,  we  find,  in  general,  more  significant  communication 
variables in the financial crisis subsample (especially for the stock market). In addition, the 
absolute size of the coefficients is higher on all bond and stock markets. The strong reaction 
during  the  financial  crisis  shows  how  crucial  central  bank  communication  is  in  turbulent 
times. Financial markets closely monitor every speech and adjust their prices to a larger extent 
than they do during ‘normal times’. 
In future research it would be interesting to examine to what extent financial market 
agents monitor central bank actions and communications directly and when and why they rely 
on newswire services. This question could be answered using a survey of financial market 
participants. 
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Appendix 
Examples of Speeches and Their Coding 
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan Before the Economic Club of New York (24 May 
2001) 
Moreover,  with  inflation  low  and  likely  to  be  contained,  the  main  threat  to  satisfactory 
economic performance appeared to come from excessive weakness in activity. … The period 
of sub-par economic growth is not yet over, and we are not free of the risk that economic 
weakness will be greater than currently anticipated, requiring further policy response. 
 
Coding: Speech Alan Greenspan EO Negative / Alan Greenspan MP Easing 
 
 
Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Before the Joint Economic Committee, US Senate 
(21 April 2004) 
After having risen at an annual rate of 2 1/2 percent in the first half of last year, real GDP 
increased at an annual pace of more than 6 percent in the second half. … Although real GDP 
is not likely to continue advancing at the same pace as in the second half of 2003, recent data 
indicate that growth of activity has remained robust thus far this year. … As I have noted 
previously,  the  federal  funds  rate  must  rise  at  some  point  to  prevent  pressures  on  price 
inflation from eventually emerging. 
 
Coding: Testimony Alan Greenspan EO Positive / Alan Greenspan MP Tightening 
 
 
Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns 
   3-month  6-month  1-year  5-year  S&P 500 
Observations  2992  2992  2992  2992  2992 
Mean  –0.002  –0.002  –0.002  –0.001  0.014 
Standard Deviation  0.065  0.052  0.052  0.069  1.377 
Skewness  –0.849  0.013  –0.612  –0.020  0.003 
Excess Kurtosis  36.92  35.13  15.55  2.73  7.23 
Minimum  –0.81  –0.61  –0.59  –0.46  –9.03 
Maximum  0.76  0.75  0.52  0.34  10.99 
 